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Article Courtesy from
Business Panama
Dollarization Panama Style
by Paul Smith
There is more to it than just saying the U.S. dollar is Panama’s currency and
this is the justification for investing there. Yes, there is no inconvertibility
risk in Panama. Yes, the U.S. dollar is used as the national currency and
remittances abroad of capital and earnings are unrestricted. So are incoming
payments. But what else is there?
Panama’s banking and monetary system are defined by two
essential elements that produce financial integration with international
markets: its own monetary system that uses the U.S. dollar as the national
currency and the participation of international banks. The results are a
performance equal to the optimum monetary policy, but without any government
intervention. Financial integration produces low interest rates and almost
unlimited credit for all economic sectors. The system is stable with low
inflation and without macroeconomic or banking crises. The system is attractive
to foreign investors for direct investment and financial investment because of
its stability, the absence of exchange or inconvertibility risk and financial
crises. These factors attract more foreign investment and therefore tend to
produce greater growth.
Market mechanisms alone resolve the macroeconomic and
monetary issues without the complications, imbalances, problems, and crises
common in the managed systems. Prices remain at their equilibrium level. The
problems produced by over-borrowing become plainly visible to the government
managers. Budget deficits cannot be financed by creating money, leaving only tax
increases. The system introduces rationality in public expenditures, avoiding
over-spending, large losses by the state agencies, or subsidies of products and
production, all of which would generate large budget deficits.
In the mid 1980s after the 1982 debt crisis, many Latin
American governments were faced with unmanageable budget deficits created in
part by policies of subsidizing certain costs to the consumers. Some of these
subsidies were applied to the price of petroleum and its derivatives like
gasoline and cooking gas, and to electric power, telephone services, bus fares
through the subsidy of gasoline, and others. When these economies were forced to
make the structural adjustments required for survival, the prices of these goods
and services were adjusted upward to reflect international prices accompanied by
a forced devaluation. There were also effects on the availability of credit and
on loan interest rates. The common reaction to these adjustments was widespread
rioting, looting, and political instability in many countries. In other emerging
economies price distortions give false signals creating perverse incentives that
induce excessive external borrowing and high risk-taking. These are some of the
factors behind sharp devaluations and macroeconomic crises.
Panama was not affected in this way because of the adjustment
mechanisms available in our monetary system and the fact that the government had
not subsidized prices to the consumers of the products and services mentioned.
To the contrary, the military government had early on increased the prices of
the public utility services as a source of general funding. It had passed on to
the consumer the price increases caused by the 1973 and 1979 oil shocks,
avoiding the social consequences of the costly structural adjustments
experienced by other countries. The decision to pass on the petroleum prices was
made necessary because the government did not have access to the resources to
finance the budget deficit a subsidy would have caused. The Panamanian people
saw that the price increases were not caused by any action of their government
and therefore accepted the price increases and made their individual
adjustments.
The Panamanian consumer tolerates shocks for three important
reasons: because his experience has been that financial shocks do not affect the
value of the local currency against the dollar so there cannot be a devaluation
and therefore the level of his savings is not affected; shocks have not affected
the availability of credit except momentarily; and interest rates have remained
stable over the long term allowing him to borrow for housing. Evidence of the
Panamanians’ confidence in their monetary system is, uniquely for Latin America,
the great volume of home mortgage loans outstanding, collectively the best
quality loan portfolio of the banking system.
The system has effective self-adjusting mechanisms for shocks. Financial
integration with the international markets allows the use of external financial
resources when required and it avoids that political crises turn into economic
crises through the banking system. Also, the Panamanian system requires less
international reserves than those required in an autonomous system. Panama’s
system is less expensive to operate, it does not require a costly supervisory
organization, nor does it bear the expense of maintaining a central bank.
It is important to recognize that it is not dollarization per
se that has brought so much stability to Panama, but rather dollarization
together with a financial center that allowed Panama’s monetary system to
integrate with the world financial markets. As a result, the Panamanian
financial system is characterized by a large number of international banks that
are indifferent at the margin between lending their resources in the local
market or placing them abroad. This gives rise to financial integration. In
Panama, banks play an essential balancing role by continuously adjusting their
local and external portfolios in response to market forces. Confronting an
excess supply of funds, banks fund profitable projects (at acceptable levels of
risk) and place excess liquidity abroad. As a result, the adjustment mechanism
for the economy is brought about through changes in the banks’ net foreign
placements and investments instead of by selective interest rate changes by a
monetary authority to manage the demand for financial resources within Panama.
Because money that cannot be lent prudently within the country flows back out,
Panama avoids a build-up of net domestic credit that might otherwise cause
inflationary pressure. Even large inflows or outflows of capital have not
significantly altered the price level.
This contrasts sharply with developing economies where the government blocks
financial integration and protects local banks from international competition.
It also draws attention to the very bad advice that some policy makers have
given in favor of capital controls. It is precisely full capital mobility that
provides the safety valve for excess funds. As to a deficiency of funds, sudden
outflows in anticipation of a devaluation are unheard of because of the fact
that uncertainty about the value of the currency is not in play.
Panama’s macroeconomic stability is, in large part, the
result of a money supply that is demand determined instead of supply determined
by government policy; the case in most countries. Thus, the Federal Reserve does
not run Panama’s monetary policy. Fed policy affects Panama only to the degree
that it affects all countries by altering the global supply of dollars, the
international reserve currency, or by affecting global interest rates. Panama’s
financial integration creates market-determined prices in the real exchange
rate, interest rates, asset prices, and arguably real wages. As a result,
financial decisions such as borrowing or the quantity of money held are in
equilibrium. The banking system takes funds from the local or international
markets to meet loan demand. It does not store excess funds for the eventuality
that there might be loan demand.
One myth about dollarizing is that it fosters instability in
the banking system and creates the need for a lender of last resort or a large
amount of reserves to support the system. The Panamanian case refutes this. In
Panama, the government has no responsibility for stepping up to rescue banks,
nor does it have the means to do it. There are no legal reserve requirements on
deposits that serve as a liquidity reserve, nor is there deposit insurance.
Despite this, there has never been a systemic bank crisis. Indeed, in several
instances international banks have acted as the system’s lenders of last resort.
Another concern is the loss of seigniorage to a government - what the central
bank books as income on the difference between the cost of printing currency and
its face value. Offsetting the loss of seigniorage for Panamanians is the fact
that smaller foreign reserve balances are needed than if a national currency
were in use.
Those countries that have created monetary boards and have
continued to issue their own currency backed 100 percent by dollars are not
really dollarized. Their citizens do not have absolute confidence that the
government will not undo the monetary board and devalue despite all the promises
made. The only way to dollarize is to dollarize the currency and all the legal
apparatus that supports the dollar as a national currency. I call it burning the
ships. Dollarization with integration contributes to price stability and robust
capital inflows and promotes high growth. Any competitive economy needs a
competitive microeconomic environment through the elimination of trade barriers,
less regulation, lower taxes, free prices, a stable currency, and minimal
government ownership.
The great capitals of South America look tired, run down, and
unkempt because the investors in old real estate do not want to make the
investment in repairs of buildings and sidewalks in the face of an inflationary
climate. This fear of inflation prevents long range planning and investment in
favor of day to day speculation for survival against devaluations. Visitors to
Panama City admire a skyline that rival’s Rio’s, except that ours is much newer.
Paul Smith, is a past-President of PanamCham, and a Vice-President of the
Association of American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America
Article Courtesy of Business Panama
The American
Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM)
and Deal Inc.
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